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The nature of how we make judgments has received a great deal of attention in the last 
few decades. Risk communication research has indicate  that risk-related messages can 
elicit affective responses in audiences, which can the  have a significant impact on how 
such audiences judge risk in general. Using a 2 x 2 between-subjects factorial design, this 
study found that, contrary to Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) findings, presenting 
narratives about lethal risk does not influence readers’ judgments about the frequency 
that risks occur, nor do such narratives influence participant worry levels about the lethal 
risks, more generally. Additionally, the inclusion f an image alongside both positively 
and negatively valenced narratives demonstrated no effect on frequency estimates or 
worry levels. These experimental conditions, although revealing no significant effects, 
did illuminate the relationship between judgments of risk frequency and corresponding 
worry levels. Implications for future research on affect and judgments of risk, as well as 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
It should come as no surprise that humans are prone to errors in judgment. 
Because we are often limited in the information to which we have access, we frequently 
rely on either incomplete evidence, emotional cues, or both when assessing the world we 
inhabit. Such errors are particularly powerful in terms of how humans judge risk. While 
certainly capable of applying logic to potentially risky situations and behaving 
accordingly, our states of mind and the manner in which messages of risk are presented 
often short-circuit logic and lead us to over or underestimate risk. These imperfections of 
cognition are commonplace and are often no cause for concern. In some instances, 
however, such cognitive failures compel actors to pursue unwarranted actions—actions 
which may have been resisted had a risk been properly assessed.  
Recurring examples of such errors in judgment are demonstrated in public polling 
data. For example, public opinion surveys demonstrate hat Americans tend to believe 
that violent crime rates are rising even though official data suggest the opposite. “These 
polling trends stand in sharp contrast to the long-term crime trends reported by the FBI 
and BJS [Bureau of Justice Statistics]. Both agencies have documented big decreases in 
violent and property crime rates since the early 1990s, when U.S. crime rates reached 
their peak” (Gramlich, 2016, para 10). In the same vein, the citizenry overestimates the 
danger posed by terrorist attacks in the United States in comparison with a seemingly 
endless list of other, more frequently occurring mortal dangers. For example, Politifact 
(2015) noted that, between 2005 and 2015, extremist attacks claimed the lives of 71 
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Americans. During that same period, gun deaths accounted for over 300,000 deaths. This 
incongruence between the degrees of risk among several risk categories is important 
The effort to gain a fuller understanding of how humans make errors when 
judging risk is not simply an academic exercise. The better we understand how and why 
such errors occur, the more likely we are to develop ffective strategies for steering the 
broader public toward reasonable assessments of thelevel of risk carried by a multitude 
of potential hazards. In discussing the impact that acts of terrorism have on the public’s 
judgment of risk, Cass Sunstein (1980) writes: 
Hence an act of terrorism will have a large number of “ ipple effects” […] 
including a demand for legal interventions that might not reduce risks and that 
might in fact make things worse. Consider, for example, the possibility that 
extensive security precautions at airports will lead people to drive rather than to 
fly; because flying is much safer than driving, such precautions might sacrifice 
many lives on balance. (p. 2) 
In other words, managing our collective judgment of risk is important on a practical level. 
Unwarranted fears about low-probability events can h ve a negative practical impact. So, 
too, can the underestimation of such events create a collective apathy towards 
preparedness and a rejection of reasonable policies designed to mitigate potential harm. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how affect influences judgments of risk and the 
degree to which varying message features play a role in guiding such judgments. 
 In chapter 2, this study will present a review of literature to provide a foundation 
for influential elements in how we judge risk. Chapter 3 will detail the methods used in 
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the effort to properly measure the constructs, as well as the participants who have taken 
part in the study. Chapter 4 will report the results of the study, which indicated that affect 
had no impact on participants’ worry levels or frequ ncy estimates. Finally, chapter 5 
will use these results as a way of broadening the discussion concerning implications for 
research on affect and judgments of risk, limitations f the methodology used, and how 
this research can be extended in future studies. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Judgments of Risk 
The term risk has been conceptualized in several different ways, l rgely 
dependent upon the domain in which risk is being studied. As it will be referred to in this 
study, the term risk simply refers to the uncertainty of outcomes or the extent to which 
outcomes are more or less probable (Folkes, 1988; Harrington & Kerr, 2017; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980; Starr, 1969;). Risk researchers, particularly those who 
operate in the domains of psychology (Arrow, 1982; Lopes, 1987; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 
2001), decision-making (Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 2008; Lu, Hsu, & Hsu, 2005), and 
communication (Coleman, 1993; Harrington & Kerr, 2017; Wray, Kreuter, Jacobsen, 
Clements, & Evans, 2004), approach risk analysis from a different perspective than those 
who operate in finance, for example. Rather than focusing on mathematical probabilities, 
those who work in social or psychological fields address the subjective nature of risk. 
The estimated severity or frequency of a given hazard will vary between subjects and 
tends to vary depending upon those subjects’ affective s ates (Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). Researchers in sociology and psychology recognize 
that such fundamental subjectivity requires a research pproach which extends beyond 
mathematical probabilities. 
 It is important to first understand how research has integrated cognitive heuristics 
into explorations regarding judgments of risk. The term heuristics refers to the mental 
shortcuts that individuals use when making cognitively complex assessments (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1975). Before heuristics were given due credit for their influence on 
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judgments of risk, a considerable volume of scholarship asserted that humans rely 
primarily on rational evaluations and logic when assessing the potential costs and benefits 
of a given course of action (Fishburn, 1970; Mossin, 1968; Pratt, 1964). Judgments of 
risk were once considered a function of primarily logical, deliberative thought processes. 
That perspective is most synonymous with expected utility theory (EUT), which 
postulates that decision-making and risk assessment ar  based on a deliberative 
comparison between potential costs or benefits of a given action (Mongin, 1997). 
Expected utility theory research has traditionally examined risk through a financial lens.  
 Such calculations have been considered by some, however, to be inadequate 
descriptions of the process by which humans evaluate risk under uncertainty. As Paul 
Slovic puts it, “Reliance on ‘the feeling of risk’ was essential to human survival in the 
course of evolution, and even today, feelings serve as a compass that guides most of our 
daily decisions” (Slovic, 2016, p. 29). To his point, imagine walking through grass, and 
your eye catches something that appears to “slither” near your feet. The natural reaction 
is something that most anyone in this situation would have—to jump back. This reaction 
is not the result of judiciously considering the snake population in the area and the 
probability of it being a poisonous or aggressive variety of snake. It is an instant reaction 
and one that supersedes deliberative information prcessing. What this example suggests 
is that human cognition has an evolutionary, purely visceral component. Human 
cognition, however, does not live only in a world of instinct. We can deliberate over the 
decisions we make and often do, provided that we hav the time and all necessary 
information. But we employ both of these systems often simultaneously by using 
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cognitive shortcuts in order to make assessments quickly without exerting too much 
cognitive effort (Kahneman, 2011). 
 The distinction between judgment and perception is not a simple one to convey. 
Risk communication researchers routinely use the terms interchangeably ( Lichtenstein, 
et al., 1978; Slovic, 2016), although some have argued that the two are not synonymous, 
arguing that perception is a sensory precursor to judgment (Coleman, 1993; Dunwoody & 
Neuwirth, 1991). Firestone and Scholl (2015) suggest that sensory cues are first 
processed and then judgments can be made according to those sensory inputs. Firestone 
and Scholl (2015) argue, for example, that “whereas we can directly see visual properties 
such as the color or size of a banana, we can only infer, conclude, or judge that the 
banana is expensive or is grown in South America” (p. 1217). This study is aimed at 
capturing the second piece of the above example—the inferences and judgments—and 
will therefore refer to judgments of risk accordingly.   
Cognitive Heuristics 
In the mid-1950s, Herbert Simon (1992) proposed that, because there are 
constraints on humans’ ability to consider every piece of relevant information when 
making a decision or assessment, we rely on cues to inform our intuition. In expanding 
on that notion, he wrote the following: 
In everyday speech, we use the word intuition to describe a problem-solving or 
question-answering performance that is speedy and for which the expert is unable 
to describe in detail the reasoning or other process that produced the answer. The 
situation has provided a cue; this cue has given th expert access to information 
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stored in memory, and the information provides the answer. Intuition is nothing 
more and nothing less than recognition. (p. 155) 
When confronted with a risk or a situation that demands a decision be made, the 
impossibility of having all pertinent information forces a person to rely on heuristics. 
Reliance on heuristics is a necessary shorthand that, although often useful, leaves us 
susceptible to errors in judgment.    
 Extant research specifically suggests that the influe ce of two cognitive 
heuristics—affect and availability—are particularly influential in how we judge risk 
(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Kahneman, 2011; Slovic, 2016; Slovic, 
Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). 
 The availability heuristic. The availability heuristic refers to the ease with which 
a person can recall instances of an occurrence or a class of occurrences (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). In terms of probability assessments, the strength of the associative 
bond between a potential external event and the eas with which a person can retrieve an 
example of a similar event has been found to influece the frequency that a person 
estimates such events occur generally (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, pp. 208–209). 
Experiments on matters as wide-ranging as participants’ judgments of their own level of 
assertiveness (Schwarz et al., 1991), the frequency with which particular letters of the 
alphabet appear in the first position in a word versus the third position (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973), and investor predictions about futre earnings (Moser, 1989) suggest 
that this heuristic is routinely employed in the process of making predictive judgments. 
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 Considerable research supports the validity of this heuristic. For example, when 
asked to judge the frequency of pairs of lethal events (e.g., strokes vs. accidents, 
tornadoes vs. asthma, lightning vs. botulism), Lichtenstein et al. (1978) found that 
respondents consistently estimated the less frequent ev ts to occur more frequently than 
the event with which it was paired. Asthma causes approximately 20 times the number of 
deaths than tornadoes, yet participants judged tornadoes to be a more frequent cause of 
death (1978, p. 555).  The authors assert that conjuring an image of a tornado is much 
easier than recalling an “image” of asthma and, therefore, participants overestimated 
tornado-related fatalities. In other words, tornadoes are more readily available in one’s 
memory than are asthma attacks. 
 In another study, Keller, Siegrist, and Gutscher (2006) found that, when presented 
with statistical probabilities of floods, participants who had personally experienced a 
flood judged flood risks as greater than those who had not. “Persons who stored images 
or narratives about floods in their memories”, the authors write, “perceived the same 
probability information differently from people without such memories” (p. 636). 
 Sherman et al. (1985) found particularly illuminatg results in their study of how 
imagination relates to availability. The researchers asked one group of participants (group 
A) to imagine a set of symptoms that could easily be envisioned (e.g., headaches, muscle 
aches) and were told that they are indicative of a disease called “Hyposcenia-B.” A 
second group (group B) was instructed to imagine a s t of symptoms that would be more 
difficult to envision (e.g., liver inflammation, disorientation). The results of the 
experiment revealed that members of group A rated th ir chances of contracting 
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“Hyposcenia-B” significantly higher than those in group B (Sherman et al., 1985, p. 123), 
suggesting that the ease or difficulty of imagining symptoms also impacts judgments of 
probability. 
 Ease of retrieval is not only a product of first-hand experience, however. 
Exposure to mediated narratives or being asked to imagine negative outcomes have also 
been found to impact individuals’ assessments of risk. For example, if a particular cause 
of death is reported more often than a different, ye  equally frequent cause of death, 
consumers of that source of information will, someti s drastically, misjudge the 
frequency of the two causes relative to one another (Combs & Slovic, 1979). The manner 
in which stories are reported and the frequency with hich particular classes of stories 
are reported (e.g., natural disasters, crime, corruption) have an impact on readers’ 
judgments of frequency. The “how” and the “how often” with regard to news reporting 
influences both affect and availability.  
 As Tversky and Kahneman (1975) describe it, “In geeral, availability is a useful 
clue for assessing frequency or probability, because in tances of large classes are recalled 
better and faster than instances of less frequent classes” (p. 15). Most importantly, the 
easier it is to recall a class or category of events, the more likely an individual is to 
overestimate the frequency of such events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975, p. 15).  
 The affect heuristic. The affect heuristic refers to responses to stimuli based on 
affective cues; affect can be described as what scholar Paul Slovic (2004) calls, “a ‘faint 
whisper of emotion’” (p. 312). In other words, the way that we feel about a stimulus—the 
“goodness” or “badness” of that feeling—informs our judgment of that stimulus. 
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Although previous research has tended to use affect, mood, feelings, and emotion 
interchangeably (Kahneman, 2011; Slovic & Peters, 2006; Wright & Bower, 1992), some 
have argued that these terms, specifically emotion and affect, are distinct and should be 
treated as such (Massumi, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).  
 The difficulty in sufficiently defining affect is evidenced by Slovic (2004) 
himself. Even after describing affect as a “faint whisper of emotion”, he goes on to use 
emotion and affect interchangeably in the same article, effectively dispensing with the 
“faint whisper” portion of his own definition. Those scholars who assert that these terms 
should not be considered synonymous (Massumi, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 2007) suggest 
that emotion is a more nuanced term than affect and is ot simply a binary—positive or 
negative—state. Schwarz and Clore (2007) argue that, “All emotions are affective, but 
not all affective things are emotions” (p. 385). They assert that emotions, unlike affective 
states, have clearly identifiable referents or causes. In other words, if a person is angry, 
that person can likely identify the source of that anger—they are angry at something. If 
that person is experiencing a negative affective state, hey are in a bad mood (p. 386).  
 One particular emotion that is most applicable to this study is worry. Worry has 
been identified as a key contributor to how risk is as essed and one’s perception of risk 
controllability (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). Though it could 
reasonably be described as either a dimension or cont ibutor to affective states 
(Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998), worry is an essential indicator of how we assess 
uncertainties such as disaster, disease, and unforeseeable accidents.  Research has 
suggested that risk probability judgments are positively associated with both worry levels 
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and desire for action that would mitigate various risks (Baron, Hershey, & Kunreuther, 
2000).  
 While this contention—that affect and specific emotions such as worry should be 
considered separate concepts—is not without merit, decades of researchers have used the 
terms interchangeably. Given that, this study will also treat emotion and affect as 
synonymous concepts. 
 For many years, affect was neglected in explanatory models of risk judgments. 
Zajonc (1980), one of the first to recognize the key role that affect plays in decision 
making and cognition, more generally, wrote the following: 
 We may completely fail to notice a person's hair color or may hardly remember 
what it was shortly after meeting the person. But we can seldom escape the 
reaction that the person impressed us as pleasant or u pleasant, agreeable or 
disagreeable, as someone to whom we were drawn or someone by whom we were 
repelled. (p. 6) 
Although Zajonc, in this passage, is referring to an interpersonal encounter, the salience 
of affect holds true in nearly every assessment humans make. We attach a positive or 
negative valence—consciously or unconsciously—to the events and situations we 
encounter.   
Narrative impact. The impact of narrative exposure has received a fair mount 
of study as it relates to judgments of risk. In 1983, Tversky and Johnson conducted an 
experiment that explored such impacts. Importantly, they noted that, “One characteristic 
that distinguishes judgments about risks from other estimates…is that they seldom occur 
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in an emotionally neutral context” (pp. 20-21). The authors theorized that a person’s 
affective response to a risk-related narrative would influence his or her judgment of that 
risk. They proposed that the affective response elicit d by a story about a specific hazard 
may inflate a reader’s estimate for the prevalence of that hazard. Their experiment, 
therefore, sought to better understand the connection between a person’s frequency 
estimates of specific risks and his or her exposure to detailed descriptions of an 
individual’s death due to a cause related to one of the risks. “Like many newspaper 
stories,” the authors wrote, “our accounts described d tails of the tragic incident, but gave 
no information about its prevalence” (1983, p. 3). They predicted that exposure to such 
accounts would increase both the subjects’ level of worry about the specific hazard 
detailed in the account as well as the subjects’ esimation of its frequency relative to the 
control condition. As they put it, they thought that the stories would produce a local 
effect. In other words, estimates related to the hazard described—as well as closely-
related hazards—would be higher for the experimental condition than for the control 
condition, they predicted. To their surprise the experimental condition produced a global 
effect, meaning that experimental subjects reported higher rat s of worry and frequency 
estimates even for unrelated risks noted in the questionnaire than did those in the control 
condition. The participants’ affective response result d in a generalized impact on their 
assessments of lethal risks—from leukemia to lightning strikes to terrorism (the 
questionnaire included a total of eighteen risk items). What the authors concluded from 
these results is that the mood induced by the detailed narrative had a global effect on 
respondents’ frequency estimates (Johnson & Tversky, 1983, p. 29). “Risks that are 
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closely linked to the story should be influenced more than unrelated risks,” they noted, 
“contrary to the present findings” (p. 30).  
 The results imply that, even though these tragic accounts were included in a set of 
three (fictional) newspaper articles, the narrative impact of the tragedy described was 
sufficient to influence the affective disposition of the respondents. In other words, the 
narrative description of a tragic event resulted in a negative affective response toward the 
cause of the tragedy, which carried over to other risks, regardless of their relationship to 
the specific risk described in the story—the “target risk”, as they described it. Johnson 
and Tversky (1983) suggest that, “The results give rise to the hypothesis that we tend to 
make judgments that are compatible with our current mood, even when the subject matter 
is unrelated to the cause of that mood” (1983, p. 16). 
 Affect and availability are certainly not independt of one another. It is 
conceivable that availability is not simply influenced by the ease with which a class is 
recalled or imagined. The affective component may ver  well “tag” those memories or 
imaginings, making them more salient and increasing the strength of availability (Slovic 
et al., 2004). For example, if one were exposed to a news item that detailed the symptoms 
of a particularly deadly infectious disease, that story would likely result in a powerful 
“imprint” on that person’s memory—in this case, a negative imprint. Subsequent 
references to that disease would therefore more easily activate the affective dimension of 
a memory, the reader’s affective response to the initial story. Slovic et al. (2004) refers to 
the catalogue of such images in a person’s mind as their “affect pool”, with each image 
“…tagged or marked to varying degrees with affect” (p. 314). 
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 Our tendency to disconnect our affective state from isk assessments, as described 
by Johnson and Tversky (1983), is in line with Zajonc’s (1980) assertion that, “The 
dismal failure in achieving substantial attitude change through various forms of 
communication or persuasion is another indication that affect is fairly independent and 
often impervious to cognition” (p. 158). This point was backed up by Johnson and 
Tversky’s (1983) findings that worry levels and frequ ncy estimates were unrelated to the 
source of participants’ negative affective state. In accordance with the results of their 
study, the following hypotheses are offered: 
H1: Participants who are exposed to a narrative that describes a tragic outcome 
due to a specific risk will report higher global worry levels than those exposed to 
a narrative that describes a positive outcome. 
H2: Participants’ who are exposed to a narrative that describes a tragic outcome 
due to a specific risk will report higher global risk frequency estimates than those 
exposed to a narrative that describes a positive outcome. 
Image-based Messaging 
The notion that affect can so substantially alter our judgments, while somewhat 
troubling to those who wish to properly communicate risk, is evidenced in persuasive 
tactics found in other domains of communication research. Persuasion research that has 
informed advertising and marketing strategies takes full advantage of the influence of 
viewer affect on message receptivity and, more specifically, the impact of imagery on 
viewer affect. While advertising may seem a world apart from risk communication, their 
practitioners each fundamentally seek to influence the attitudes of their audiences 
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(O’keefe, 2002). While the advertiser appeals to the consumer in the interest of selling a 
product, risk communicators appeal to their audience i  the interest of correcting any 
misperceptions an audience may have about a given risk. It is therefore important to 
understand the influence that image presentation has on message receptivity in general, as 
it is not a tool available only to those who are interested in a financial profit. 
Attitudes and judgments. Several advertising effects studies have supported th  
notion that images have a stronger influence on consumer attitudes and preferences than 
do text-based messaging strategies (Edell & Burke, 1987; MacInnis & Price, 1987; Scott, 
1994). What these findings imply is that images have  greater salience for message 
receivers than do narrative descriptions. For example, Mitchell and Olson’s (1981) study 
on how the content of an advertisement influences vi wer attitudes found that the 
inclusion of images had a significant effect on respondents’ beliefs about product 
attributes, attitudes, and their intentions to purchase the product (p. 327). 
More in line with judgments of risk, health communicat on scholars have noted 
the influence of image-based messages in promoting r discouraging risky behaviors.  In 
their meta-analysis of health communication messaging, Houts et al. (2006) found that 
adding images to text-based messages “can increase patient attention, comprehension, 
recall and adherence” (p. 187). It is unclear, however, if the persuasive power of the 
image has a similar impact with regard to risk asses ments. If imagery is more effective 
in inducing attitude changes than text-based narratives, whether they are related to the 
attractiveness of a product or one’s propensity to engage in dangerous behaviors, it can 
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reasonably be assumed that images should also provea more powerful influence over risk 
assessments.  
 If the ease with which a hazardous image is conjured influences how we judge 
that hazard, it may well follow that overtly providing that image has a similar effect. 
Because the hazardous image is provided, exposure to it ffectively activates the 
availability heuristic and, consequently, the affect heuristic. It would then follow, based 
on Tversky and Johnson’s (1983) findings, that participants would estimate the hazard to 
be more prevalent than those who had not been exposd t  the image. Research regarding 
this question, however, is limited and the effect of image inclusion in this context is not 
fully understood. Because the current media landscape is heavily reliant on imagery, it is 
important to gain a better understanding of how such imagery impacts judgments of risk. 
Therefore, the following research questions are put forth: 
RQ1a: Does exposure to an image alongside a tragic n rrative result in greater 
local risk frequency estimates of message receivers than those who only are only 
exposed to the narrative? 
RQ1b: Does exposure to an image alongside a tragic narrative result in greater 
local worry levels of message receivers than those who only are only exposed to 
the narrative? 
RQ2a: Does exposure to an image alongside a tragic n rrative result in greater 
global risk frequency estimates of message receivers than those who only are only 
exposed to the narrative? 
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RQ2b: Does exposure to an image alongside a tragic narrative result in greater 
global worry levels of message receivers than those who only are only exposed to 
the narrative? 
It is certainly plausible that participants who arep ovided with an image will respond 
similarly to those surveyed by Johnson and Tversky (1983)—the presence of a tragic 
image may be no more impactful than a tragic narrative that they find easy to visualize. It 
may, however, provide a clarity of a hazard that they cannot sufficiently picture in their 
heads, resulting in a more pronounced impact on their aff ctive response and, as a result, 
their worry levels and frequency estimates for thatpar icular hazard. 
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Chapter Three: Methods 
Overview 
 The experimental method employed in this study was designed, like Tversky and 
Johnson’s (1983), to explore the degree to which affect influences judgments of risk. The 
experimental conditions (detailed in the “Procedure” sub-section below) were designed to 
elicit an affective response with regard to a specific risk while providing minimal data 
related to its general prevalence. The affective response of participants could then be 
recorded across all conditions and compared with participants’ frequency estimates 
regarding a range of potential hazards. Like Tversky and Johnson (1983), this study 
recorded participants’ worry levels and frequency estimates for a range of potentially 
lethal hazards as a way of measuring their local and global judgments of risk (p. 21). 
Worry level and frequency estimates served as the dep ndent variables for the hypotheses 
and research questions. 
 The set of risks used in this study is identical to those used in Johnson and 
Tversky’s (1983). They arrived at their set by first surveying an undergraduate 
population, which identified 36 risks. The authors then narrowed the list to 18 by 
factoring in those most frequently listed by the students along with those that are actually 
the most common causes of death. 
 In order to determine similarity between various risks, Johnson and Tversky 
(1983) conducted another survey of undergraduate studen s who were asked to rate the 
similarity between risks on a 10 point scale. Using a  additive tree algorithm (Sattath & 
Tversky, 1977) the authors used the survey responses to construct a “tree” of similarity, 
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in which the risks “…appear as terminal nodes of the tree, and the distance between 
objects is the length of the horizontal part of the path that connects them” (Johnson & 
Tversky, 1983, p. 21). The resulting tree is pictured in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1. Additive tree representation from Tversky and Johnson (1983, p. 22) 
For Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) study, the additive tree above served as the basis for 
determining if reported worry levels and frequency estimates suggested a local or global 
effect. The same list of hazards was used in this current study. Because the experimental 
conditions in this study describe death due to a fire, an increase in worry levels and 
frequency estimates for deaths by fire could be considered an indication of a local effect. 
Any increase, relative to the control condition, in worry levels or frequency estimates for 
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dissimilar hazards—those that fall outside of the “natural disaster” category (tornadoes, 
floods, lightning, fire, and electrocution)—would suggest a generalized influence and 
could then be considered an indication of a global effect. 
Participants 
 Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, an advertisement was pl ced online to recruit 
participants for this study. The recruitment took place on March 28th, 2018. The 
advertisement solicited any participants 18 or over, who live in the United States, and 
have a positive Mechanical Turk rating, which ensured that participants had established 
themselves as reliable users of the service. Additionally, the population of interest was 
U.S. residents over the age of 18 and the parameters of the recruitment reflected the 
target population. After agreeing to an informed consent form that outlined any potential 
risks associated with participation in the study, as well as confirming their ages to be at 
least 18, participants were directed to the online study. All materials presented to 
participants were approved by Portland State Univers ty’s Institutional Review Board 
prior to distribution online. 
 Of the entire participant pool (N = 254) 18 participants (7.1%) were omitted from 
the analysis due to incomplete responses (n = 1) or a failure to correctly answer the 
attention check (n = 16). A single additional participant was excluded because he or she 
estimated that over fifty percent of the U.S. population died in 2017. Of the remaining 
235 participants, there were 132 males (56.2%) and 103 females (43.8%). Participants 
who reported ethnicity self-identified as White/Cauc sian (n = 186, 79.1%), Hispanic or 
Latino (n = 16, 6.8%), Black or African American (= 23, 9.8%), Asian/Pacific Islander 
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(n = 16, 6.8%), and “Other” (n = 5, 2.1%). Participant ages ranged from 21 to 69 (M = 
35.87, SD = 10.48). 
Procedure  
The study employed a 2 x 2 between-subjects factorial design to test the 
hypotheses and research questions. The independent variables included were story type 
(positive or tragic) and image inclusion (without image or with image); see table 1. 
Table 1 






                                 Image (IV) 
 Without With 
Positive 
Positive story without 
image (Condition one) 
Positive story with image 
(Condition two) 
Tragic 
Tragic story without 
image (Condition three) 
Tragic story with image 
(Condition four) 
 
In accordance with Johnson and Tversky’s design (1983, p. 23), the first part of the 
questionnaire began with the following instructions: “A popular trend in journalism has 
been the inclusion of personal interest and feature stories. Please carefully read the short 
newspaper article on the following page and answer the questions that follow.” The 
experimental stimulus was then presented to the participant.  
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As a point of reference, the narratives which served as the experimental stimuli in 
Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) original study were described in the following way: 
All four groups were presented with two brief and mundane items, which were 
two paragraphs long, modeled after "People in the News" columns in local papers. 
The three experimental groups each received an additional story about the death 
of a single person. The experimental stories that describe the fatal events 
consisted of three paragraphs. The portrayal of the death was detailed, designed to 
induce anxiety and worry. (p. 23) 
The narratives used in the current study were adapte  from an actual article in The 
Oregonian newspaper’s online publication, OregonLive.com (Eastm n, 2017). It 
described a local resident who had recently won a remodeled home as a prize giveaway 
from a popular television program. The positive tone f the article aligned with the 
“People in the News” type of narrative provided to the control group in the original study 
(Johnson & Tversky, 1983).  
The positive condition (Condition 1) in this study consisted of a shortened version 
of the article described above; it appeared underneath a headline that read “Local Man 
Wins Big.” The title of the article was aimed at being both succinct and innocuous so as 
to avoid any priming effects. For all conditions, the name of the prize winner was 
changed from Magne Jensen to Steven McInnis. The name change was intended to 
protect the actual identity of the subject of the piece. The location of the prize home was 
changed from Knoxville, Tennessee to Ventura, Californ a. The text of the positive 
article read as follows: 
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Good fortune struck Steven McInnis, a local man from Beaverton, Oregon, on 
Sunday. More than 65 million people had entered HGTV's Urban Oasis 
Giveaway. And luck hadn't shone much on McInnis in the past. Once, he won a 
book from a local radio show. But all that changed when his name was drawn and 
he won the contest's grand prize: A remodeled and furnished bungalow-style 
house in Southern California, plus $50,000 cash.  
The home and garden channel's 2017 giveaway was a twi t on past pricey 
drawings. This year, instead of a contemporary home, the winner received a 
remodeled Craftsman-style house in an upscale neighborhood just outside of 
Ventura, California. "I figured, what have I got to lose? You never know," 
McInnis told HGTV. When he first heard he was going to receive a house, he 
couldn’t believe it. "I've never won anything like this in my life," he said. 
McInnis, his wife, and son plan to move into their new home in April. 
The positive condition that included an image (Condition 2) consisted of an identical 
story and headline alongside an image (see Figure 1) of the home won by the subject of 
the story. The image was chosen to align with its 
description—a furnished, bungalow-style 
home—and was borrowed from a website of a 
company that specializes in selling custom home 
plans for bungalow-style homes (“Bungalow 
House Plans,” n.d.).  The negative condition            Figure2: Condition 2 image 
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(Condition 3) was also adapted from the original The Oregonian article, although it 
described the subject as having died in a California wildfire while moving into the new 
home. The location change previously mentioned was included to increase the 
plausibility of the tragic account. The headline of the story read “Local Man Dies in 
Wildfire.” The title of the article was also aimed at being both succinct and innocuous so 
as to avoid any priming effects. The text of the tragic article read as follows: 
Tragedy struck on Sunday, as Beaverton, Oregon resident Steven McInnis lost his 
life to the wildfires raging in Southern California. As readers may remember, 
McInnis was a recent winner of HGTV’s Urban Oasis Gveaway. The prize for 
the contest was a remodeled Craftsman-style house in an upscale neighborhood 
just outside of Ventura, California, along with $50,0 0 cash. He was in the 
process of moving into his new home when high winds pu hed the fire into his 
neighborhood overnight, destroying several homes. Late Monday evening, 
search and rescue officials confirmed that McInnis did not survive the blaze.  
Another resident of the neighborhood described the area as looking “like a war 
zone”. “The fire moved so quickly into our neighborh od,” she said, “that my son 
and I were lucky to escape. I don’t think that anyone realized just how quickly it 
could overtake our homes. It’s just such a tragedy” McInnis is survived by his 
wife and their ten year-old son. 
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The negative condition that included an image (Condition 4) was structured in much the 
same way as condition two. The negative story appeared longside an image of a burning 
house (Warburg, 2018). The image was borrowed from a Santa Barbara-based news site 
(see Figure 4). It appeared in an article about pending lawsuits over the Thomas Fire, a 
California wildfire that burned over 280,000 acres 
in Southern California from December, 2017 to 
January, 2018. All conditions were presented in 
the form of newspaper mock-ups from a fictional 
newspaper called The Beaverton Times. A fictional          Figure 3: Tragic narrative 
 publication was used in order to avoid activating pre-existing perceptions of source 
credibility. The masthead of the newspaper was ident cal for all four conditions. The 
articles in the positive conditions (1 and 2) contained 163 words. The articles in the 
negative conditions (3 and 4) contained 159 words. The format (font type, image 
size/position, story position) was matched between conditions. 
It should be noted that these conditions were not presented as gain or loss frames; 
instead, the positive and tragic stories described vastly different outcomes for the subject 
of the article Participants completed the experiment through Qualtrics, an online survey 
platform. Each was presented with one of the four cnditions. The assignment of the 
conditions was randomly generated by Qualtrics. The texts and images for all conditions 
are included in Appendix A. 
 Participants completed the experiment through Qualtrics, an online survey 
platform. Each was presented with one of the four cnditions. The assignment of the 
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conditions was randomly generated by Qualtrics and evenly distributed among the 
participants.  
Measures 
Worry level. In accordance with Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) study, worry 
level was measured using a single item.  Participants were asked to rate their level of 
worry from 1 to 10 for each of the 18 risks (see Figure 1; see Appendix B) used in the 
original study, with 1 = not worried at all and 10 = extremely worried. The order of the 
risks was automatically randomized through Qualtrics.  
Local worry levels were measured by participants’ re ponses to the target risk 
included in the tragically valenced narrative—fire. Global worry levels were measured by 
responses to all risks that did not fall into the natural disaster category—accidental falls, 
traffic accidents, airplane accidents, homicide, terrorism, war, nuclear accidents, toxic 
chemical spills, stroke, heart disease, leukemia, stomach cancer, and lung cancer (see 
Figure 1). The mean worry level for these risks combined comprised participants’ global 
worry level. 
Frequency estimates. Frequency estimates were also based on the measures used 
by Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) study. Estimates were measured in a similarly simple 
manner—participants were simply asked to estimate the annual number of fatalities in the 
U.S. for each of the risks provided. As a way of providing a common anchor to all 
respondents, participants were first told that approximately 37,000 Americans died in 
automobile accidents in 2017 (Highway Deaths Lead Ntional Increase in Transportation 
Fatalities,” n.d.). They were then asked to estimate annual fatality totals for the remaining 
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17 risks. The order of the risks was automatically randomized through Qualtrics. As with 
measurements of worry level, proximity to the target risk (fire) was used to determine 
which risks were categorized as local or global.  
Additional measures. All participants were asked after reading the article to rate 
clarity, style, interest, informativeness, overall quality of writing, and source credibility 
on a 10 point Likert-type scale. These items served as istractors. Additionally, questions 
regarding participants’ experiences with and attitudes about good fortune were included 
as distractors to the items that measured participant judgments of lethal events. The 
questions regarding good fortune served to further disguise the hypotheses and research 
questions of the study. By disguising the aim of the survey, the distractors mitigate the 
risk of priming participants and influencing their responses. 
Participants were then each asked to answer a single item, 10 point mood question 
which asked how they would feel if they had read a similar story in a local newspaper. 
Response options ranged from “Negative, Depressed” to “Positive, Uplifted”. This item 
served as a manipulation check and was identical to the check used in the original study 
(Johnson & Tversky, 1983, p.23). 
The final set of survey questions recorded demographic data from the participants 
including, age, gender, and ethnicity. 
Analysis 
 To ensure valid results, respondents who did not fi ish the survey or failed the 
attention check were excluded from the final analysis (n = 19). As participants’ 
frequency estimates produced a number of extreme outli rs, those estimates were 
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winsorized, which is an accepted method of accounting for univariate outliers (Keselman, 
Algina, Lix, Wilcox, & Deering, 2008). Winsorizing univariate outliers simply means 
that “all scores whose z score equivalent is 3.0 or greater are trimmed to whatever score 
corresponds to a z score of 3.0” (Pelham, 2012, p. 371).  
 Both hypotheses were analyzed using independent samples t tests and all research 
questions were analyzed using 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA testing. Missing cases 
were excluded pairwise rather than listwise, so that participants’ responses were not 
completely excluded due to an unanswered question. Additionally, because participants’ 
local and global frequency estimates were skewed, chi-square tests were also conducted 
as sensitivity checks. Significance level for all analysis was set a priori at .05. 
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Chapter Four: Results 
Participant responses to a 10-point mood scale served as a manipulation check. 
Those who were exposed to a story with a positive val nce (n = 116) reported 
significantly more positive responses (M = 7.7, SD = 1.8) than did those who were 
exposed to a tragic story (n = 119, M =3.2, SD = 2, t(233) = 18, p < .001). The 
manipulation check was therefore successful. 
 Overall, participants’ responses to frequency estimates were highly inconsistent. 
Across all conditions, global estimate means (the overall mean for all risks outside of the 
natural disaster category) had a range of just under 470,000 and a standard deviation of 
over 63,000. The response range for local frequency stimates (the mean for fire 
fatalities) was over 180,000, with a standard deviation of over 22,000. Mean worry levels 
ranged from lows of 2.60 (SD = 2.35) and 2.70 (SD = 2.58) for toxic chemical spills and 
nuclear accidents, respectively, to highs of 6.32 (SD = 2.77) and 6.47 (SD = 2.61) for 
heart disease and traffic accidents, respectively. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants who were exposed to a narrative that 
describes a tragic outcome (n = 55) due to a specific risk would report higher global 
worry levels than those exposed to a narrative that describes a positive outcome (n = 54). 
Replicating Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) study, neither condition used to test H1 
included an image. A two-tailed independent samples t t t was conducted on worry 
levels for all global risks. The results indicated no statistically significant difference 
between those exposed to a tragic narrative (M = 4.1, SD = 2.1) and those exposed to a 
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positive narrative (M = 4.1, SD = 1.9, t(107) = -0.06, p = .95). Hypothesis 1 was therefore 
unsupported. 
Similarly, hypothesis 2 predicted that participants exposed to a narrative that 
describes a tragic outcome due to a specific risk would report higher global frequency 
estimates than those exposed to a narrative that describ s a positive outcome. A two-
tailed independent samples t test was conducted on mean estimates for all global risks. 
Hypothesis 2 was unsupported as results indicated no statistically significant difference in 
global frequency estimates between those who read a tragic story (M = 33,757, SD = 
67,524) and those who read a positive story (M = 27,807, SD = 48,332, t(107) = -0.53, p 
= .60).  
To analyze the research questions, 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA testing was 
conducted in order to determine if any effects were present according to story valence or 
image inclusion as well as any interaction effects. Research question 1a examined if the 
inclusion of an image alongside a tragic narrative would impact participants’ local 
frequency estimates. The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant main effect for 
image inclusion on participants’ local frequency estimates, F(1/231) = 2.03, p = .16. 
Similarly, no significant effect was observed according to story valence, F(1/231) = 0.25, 
p = .62. Finally, ANOVA testing indicated no significant interaction effect on 
participants’ local frequency estimates, F(1/231) = 2.73, p = .10. In summary, local 
frequency estimates were not significantly affected by either of the independent variables 
(see Table 1). 
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Research question 1b examined if the inclusion of an image alongside a tragic 
narrative would impact participants’ local worry levels. The results of ANOVA testing 
indicated no significant main effect for image inclusion on participants’ local worry 
levels, F(1/231) = 0.00, p = .99. Similarly, no significant effect was observed according 
to story valence, F(1/231) = 0.28, p = .60. Finally, ANOVA testing indicated no 
significant interaction effect on participants’ local frequency estimates, F(1/231) = 0.20, 
p = .66. Just as with local frequency estimates, participants’ local worry levels were not 
significantly impacted by either of the independent variables. 
Table 2 
Local Frequency Estimates 
Story Valence N M SD 
Positive    
            Without Image 54 8,202 24,688 
        With Image 62 8,860       15,768 
Total 116 7,158 28,698 
Tragic    
           Without Image 55 14,470 32,080 
        With Image 64 5,509 13,636 
Total 119 9,650 24,297 
 
Research questions 2a and 2b were concerned with global frequency estimates 
and worry levels and, like RQ1a and RQ1b, whether image inclusion would impact 
participant responses. For RQ2a, ANOVA testing indicated no significant effect for 
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image inclusion (F(1/231) = 1.32, p = .25) or story valence (F 1/231) = 0.02, p = .90) on 
global frequency estimates. Additionally, no significant interaction effects were revealed, 
F(1/231) = 0.73, p = .40. Similar to local frequency estimates, participants’ global 
frequency estimates were not significantly impacted by either of the independent 
variables (see Table 2). 
Research question 2b examined if image inclusion would impact participants’ 
global worry levels. ANOVA testing indicated no sign ficant effect for image inclusion, 
F(1/231) = 3.24, p = .07. Similarly, no significant effect was revealed for story valence 
on global worry levels, F(1/231) = 0.13, p = .72. Finally, ANOVA testing revealed no 
interaction effects on global worry levels, F(1/231) = 0.20, p = .66. As with all research 
questions posed, neither of the independent variables significantly impacted participants’ 
global worry levels. 
Because both local and global frequency estimates were skewed, estimates were 
also broken into deciles to allow for non-parametric testing. Analysis using chi-square 
testing revealed no significant effect for story valence (χ2(9) = 2.2, p = .99) or image 
inclusion (χ2(9) = 8.4, p = .50) on participants’ global frequency estimates. Similarly, chi-
square testing revealed no significant effect for st y valence (χ2(9) = 4.3, p = .89) or 
image inclusion (χ2(9) = 4.3, p = .47) on participants’ local frequency estimates. 
Post-hoc Analysis 
 In order to examine the relationship between worry levels and frequency 
estimates, correlation testing was run on participant responses for each individual risk.  
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Table 3 
Global Frequency Estimates 
Story Valence N M SD 
Positive    
Without Image 54 27,807 48,332 
        With 
Image 
62 44,441 69,095 
Total 116 36,698 60,650 
Tragic    
Without Image 55 33,757 67,524 
        With 
Image 
64 35,878 63,436 
Total 119 35,078 66,286 
The results revealed significant positive correlations between worry levels and frequency 
estimates for all but three of the risks presented—heart disease, lung cancer, and 
homicide. 
When comparing all four conditions, only the tragic narrative which included an 
image revealed a significant correlation between local frequency estimates and worry 
levels, rs = 0.29, n = 64, p = .02. When comparing tragic and positive narrative val nce, 
only the tragic stories revealed a significant correlation, rs = 0.23, n = 119, p = .01. When 
comparing image inclusion and image exclusion, only those narratives which included an 
image revealed a significant correlation between local frequency estimates and local 
worry levels, rs = 0.24, n = 126, p = .01. 
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Table 4 
Correlations between frequency estimates and worry levels 
Risk rs p 
Floods .29 < .001** 
Stomach Cancer .16  .01* 
Tornadoes .24 < .001** 
Heart Disease .02 .75 
Homicide .01 .91 
Nuclear Accidents .31 < .001** 
Terrorism .35 < .001** 
Leukemia .15  .03* 
Lightning Strikes .30 < .001** 
Lung Cancer .06                       .32 
Accidental Falls .15  .02* 
Stroke .14  .03* 
Airplane Accidents .26  < .001** 
Electrocution .18 < .01** 
War  .42  < .001** 
Toxic Chemical Spills .39  < .001** 
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
 Although this study revealed no statistically significant findings with regard to the 
hypotheses and research questions, there are inferences that can potentially be drawn 
from these results. Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that participants exposed to a tragic 
narrative would report higher global worry levels and frequency estimates, respectively, 
than those exposed to a positively valenced narrative. Neither hypothesis was supported 
by this study’s findings. The research questions addressed the potential for an image 
placed alongside a narrative to influence local and global worry levels and frequency 
estimates. The results indicated that participant responses were not influenced by the 
presence of an image. In short, the results of this study suggest that neither the valence of 
a narrative nor the presence of an accompanying imae h s an impact on readers’ 
judgments of a wide variety of lethal risks.  
 This section will highlight a few factors that may have played a part in producing 
the results of this study—generational shifts in how mediated messages are processed, the 
difficulty of making risk estimates, and finally, the potential overstatement of how affect 
impacts judgments of risk. Additionally, the relationship between worry levels and risk 
estimates will be addressed, with special attention paid to the influence of perceived 
control of risk. 
The Trouble with Risk Estimates 
 One surprising result of this study’s findings is the wide range of responses with 
regard to frequency estimates. Because global estimates were calculations of the overall 
mean for twelve risks, it is perhaps reasonable that the range estimates was so large. 
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However, analysis of local frequency estimates (mean estimates for a single risk—fire) 
also revealed a sizable range of responses.  
 Though surprising, the vast range of responses observed in this study does support 
previous research, which has noted the difficulty that many people have with making 
predictive judgments of risk (Adelswärd, & Sachs, 1996; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 
2001). Even when provided with an anchor—the number of annual traffic fatalities—
respondents’ frequency estimates varied wildly. These results make those found by 
Johnson and Tversky (1983) all the more surprising. Observing statistical significance in 
a set of responses so shockingly erratic was unexpected.  
Generational Shifts 
 Because Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) original study was conducted 35 years 
ago, participants now may have a greater familiarity w h mediated narratives of tragedy 
than they did then in the early 1980s. One might assume that the average media consumer 
is now more desensitized to emotional narrative or images than they once were. This, 
however, does not account for the results which indicated the valance of the narrative did
influence participants’ responses to the 10-point mood scale, which served as the 
manipulation check. The wording of the manipulation check may account for how 
participants responded—“How would you feel if you had read this story in your local 
newspaper or saw it on Facebook?” The word “would” may have prompted participants 
to report not how they did feel after exposure to the stimulus but how they imagine they 
would feel. 
The Influence of Affect 
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 One factor that may supersede a person’s particular affective state is their general 
emotional disposition. If a particular respondent is of a generally optimistic disposition, 
for example, the impact of their affective response to a tragic narrative may be blunted. 
Butler and Matthews (1983) found that both anxious and depressed individuals 
overestimated risk when compared with matched control subjects (p. 58). Others studies 
have found that valence may be too broad to be considered the causal agent in how 
people estimate risk. For example, Lerner and Keltner (2000) found that inducing two 
emotions that can both be described as negative—fear and anger—produced different 
results from one another. Fearful individuals reported significantly higher risk 
assessments than did angry individuals (p. 484). Lerner and Keltner (2000) attributed this 
finding to each emotion’s relationship to certainty and control. Angry participants, they 
found, perceived greater certainty and control over th ir environment and fearful 
participants perceived less of each (p. 485). If fear and anger are better predictors of how 
emotion influences judgments of risk, then simply measuring positive or negative affect 
may be insufficient.  
Risk and Judgments of Control 
Varying the control that participants’ might have over the events described in this 
study’s stimuli may be particularly fruitful in investigating the role that control has in 
how we judge risk. The narratives presented, regardless of condition, implied a lack of 
control over the outcomes described. The positively a enced narratives described 
someone who was struck by good fortune—winning a prize f om a random drawing. The 
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tragically valenced narratives described someone who as struck by bad fortune—
trapped by a rapidly-approaching wildfire. 
The simplest inference that one could draw from these r sults is that affective 
states are not sufficient to significantly alter peo le’s risk frequency estimates and worry 
levels. That assertion, however, implies flawed or unsatisfactory conclusions suggested 
by much of the research on this subject. No single study is sufficient to rebut decades of 
research. This study, however, does potentially offer some additional insight into the 
relative influence of affective states on judgments of risk. 
 Post hoc analysis demonstrated one particular result that warrants examination. 
While participants’ estimates were quite erratic, their worry levels tended to correlate 
with their estimates for each risk. There were, however, three exceptions. Worry levels 
and frequency estimates were not correlated with regard to lung cancer, heart disease, and 
homicide. These risks are particularly noteworthy as they are each related to control. 
 One factor that was not explicitly measured in this study is that of an individual’s 
ability to control a given risk. Many of the risks that participants were asked to rate were 
disasters or accidents that could easily be judged as uncontrollable. However, lung 
cancer, heart disease, and homicide may have been perceived as controllable, which 
could account for these non-correlated results. For example, a participant might recognize 
the high rate of lung cancer in America but the participant is a non-smoker. This might 
lead to a high estimate and a low worry level. Participants may understand lung cancer to 
be a disease that is best attributed to lifestyle choices (Riles, Sangalang, Hurley, & 
Tewksbury, 2015). The same can be said for heart disease—it is a health issue that 
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primarily affects the middle-aged and older and is also perceived to be controllable 
through diet and exercise. Finally, homicide is a lethal risk that is certainly sensational 
and therefore receives much attention from news sources. That, however, does not 
necessarily translate into high levels of worry for pa ticipants. They may very well think 
that the homicide rate is high but only in certain cities or communities. “It is dangerous in 
those places,” they might think, “but not here.” In this case their perceived control is 
geographically based, whereas judgments of the other two risks were based primarily on 
lifestyle. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 This study was not without its limitations. First, the participant pool for the study 
was drawn from Mechanical Turk, whose worker pool tends to skew younger, slightly 
better educated, and more likely Caucasian than the gen ral population of the United 
States (Sheehan, 2018, p. 4). Indeed, the demographic composition in this study 
potentially suffers from the “white male effect”, which suggests that white males feel less 
vulnerable to risk and they therefore underestimate risk in general (Finucane, Slovic, 
Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000). A truly generalized U.S. population may be more 
revealing in terms of how we make judgments of risk. Second, this study did not include 
participants’ personal experience with any of the risks. If one is to examine both the 
availability and affect heuristics, factoring in personal experience would better illuminate 
the results. After all, availability and affect are largely dependent upon the “imprint” that 
an event or class of events has in the mind of a given participant. Exposing a participant 
to a narrative describing a tragic incident might well elicit different responses from those 
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who have personal experience with a similar tragedy than with one who has not. 
Additionally, future research into this subject might et better results if the accuracy of 
participants’ frequency estimates are somehow incentivized. The massive range of 
estimates could potentially be attenuated if participants were truly trying to estimate 
correctly. If the same range of responses were found, even with the inclusion of accuracy 
incentives, the results from this study could be more solidly supported as truly reflective 
of participants’ best-faith efforts. Such an experiment could be run in a laboratory setting 
to ensure that participants are not tempted to retrieve the actual numbers from other 
sources. 
 Finally, the current media landscape is heavily video-based and researchers would 
be wise to integrate video elements into their experim ntal designs. A still photo of, in 
this case, a house on fire may not sufficiently elicit a strong emotional reaction. Updating 
the stimuli to fit the current media environment would be a well-advised strategy for 
arriving at results with greater external validity. 
Conclusion 
 The manner by which humans make judgments about risk is still somewhat 
murky. Research has indicated that cognitive heuristics certainly play a central role, 
although to what extent and to what effect is not entir ly clear. Johnson and Tversky’s 
(1983) study found that a person’s affect toward a specific risk influences not only their 
judgment of that risk but a wide variety of separate, unrelated risks. This study found that 
valence had no effect on such judgments.  
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 Additionally, the inclusion of an image in messages r garding lethal risk had no 
effect on how participants judged risk in general. Although it seems to make logical sense 
that providing a tragic image would effectively activa e both the affect and availability 
heuristics, this study showed no evidence of such activation. Regardless of the valence of 
the narrative presented, inclusion of an accompanying image did not influence 
participants’ worry or frequency estimates either locally or globally. 
 There is a substantial body of literature that suggests both availability and affect 
are significant factors in how we judge risk, although positive and negative affect are 
both broad classifications of one’s emotional state. In the same regard, a person’s sense 
of control or certainty likely plays a part in how on assesses risk. Accounting for each 
variable in making such determinations is clearly a ch llenge. A greater understanding of 
how we process risk, though, is of real importance. An individual, a group, or even a 
society that badly misjudges risk is prone to over or undercompensate when they try to 
address a given risk. If we, collectively, have a more well-calibrated understanding of the 
risks to which we are exposed, we may then be more likely to take reasonable steps to 
mitigate pervasive risks, and perhaps less likely to overinflate our concern about 
sensationalized, yet uncommon risks.   
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Appendix A – Experimental Stimuli 
All conditions begin with the following statement: 
“A popular trend in journalism has been the inclusion of personal interest and feature 
stories. Please carefully read the short newspaper article on the following page and 





   51 
 








   53 
 








   54 
 
Appendix B – Survey Instrument 
Q7 On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate the article you have just read according to the 
elements listed below. 
 1   (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 
(High) 
Clarity  o  o o o o o o o o o 
Interest  o  o o o o o o o o o 
Style  o  o o o o o o o o o 
Informativeness  o  o o o o o o o o o 
Objectivity  o  o o o o o o o o o 
Overall Quality o  o o o o o o o o o 










   o  o o o o o o o o o  
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Q13 Please estimate the number of people in the United States that die each year from the 
following causes. For your reference, traffic accidents accounted for about 37,000 deaths 
in the U.S. in 2017.                 
o Leukemia _________________________________________ 
o Floods ____________________________________________ 
o Stomach Cancer ____________________________________ 
o Tornadoes _________________________________________ 
o Heart Disease _____________________________________ 
o Homicide _________________________________________ 
o Nuclear Accidents __________________________________ 
o Terrorism _________________________________________ 
o Lightning Strikes _________________________________ 
o Lung Cancer _______________________________________ 
o Accidental Falls __________________________________ 
o Stroke ____________________________________________ 
o Airplane Accidents ________________________________ 
o Electrocution ______________________________________ 
o Fire ______________________________________________ 
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o War ______________________________________________ 
o Toxic Chemical Spills _____________________________ 
Q14 For each potential hazard listed below, please indicate your general 
level of worry on a scale from 1 (Not worried at all) to 10 (Extremely 
worried). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Floods  o o o o o o o o o o
Stomach 
Cancer  o o o o o o o o o o
Tornadoes  o o o o o o o o o o
Heart 
Disease  o o o o o o o o o o
Traffic 
Accidents  o o o o o o o o o o
Homicide  o o o o o o o o o o
Nuclear 
Accidents  o o o o o o o o o o
Terrorism  o o o o o o o o o o
Leukemia  o o o o o o o o o o
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Lightning 
Strikes  o o o o o o o o o o
Lung Cancer  o o o o o o o o o o
Accidental 
Falls  o o o o o o o o o o
Stroke  o o o o o o o o o o
Airplane 
Accidents  o o o o o o o o o o
Electrocution  o o o o o o o o o o
Fire  o o o o o o o o o o




o o o o o o o o o o
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Q12 Please estimate the number of people per year in the United States who won the 
following prizes in 2017.   
o Lottery jackpot over one million dollars__________________________ 
o Lottery jackpot over ten million dollars ______________________ 
o A new home ____________________________________ 
o A timeshare_____________________________________ 
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Q10 Have you ever won anything by random chance (for example, a raffle prize or 
money from a lottery ticket)? 
 Yes No 
   o  o  
 
Q15 You would describe your ethnicity as: (select all th t apply) 
 White/Caucasian  
 Hispanic or Latino  
 Black or African American  
 Native American or American Indian  
 Asian / Pacific Islander  
 Other  
 Prefer not to answer  
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Q16 Please select your gender. 
o Male  
o Female  
o Non-gendered  
o Prefer not to answer  
 
Q17 In what year were you born?  _________________  
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Appendix C – Informed Consent Form 
Q1 Informed Consent Form 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Derek Bonniksen under 
the direction of Dr. Lauren Frank. This study attempts to collect information about 
stylistic features of news reporting. You were selected as a possible participant in this 
study because you are at least 18 years old and have a positive rating on Mechanical 
Turk.     
Procedures        
If you decide to participate, you will be asked read a short newspaper article and answer 
questions about your reaction to it. You will then be asked to complete a questionnaire 
about your response to the story. The entire study will take approximately 20 
minutes.              
   
Risks/Discomforts         
Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel uncomfortable 
when asked to read a personal interest story. You are welcome to skip any question that 
you feel uncomfortable answering.             
Benefits 
You may not receive any direct benefit from taking part in this study. However, it is 
hoped that through your participation, the study ma help to increase knowledge which 
may help others in the future.            
Confidentiality 
All information that is obtained in connection with this study will be kept confidential 
and will only be reported in an aggregate format (by reporting only combined results and 
never reporting individual ones). All questionnaires will be concealed, and no one other 
than the research team will have access to them. At no point will you name be linked to 
your answers.           
Compensation  
For completing this study you will receive $1.25 as compensation to your Mechanical 
Turk account.        
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Participation         
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to 
withdraw at any time or refuse to participate entirely.       
Questions about the Research 
If you have questions or concerns regarding this study, contact Derek Bonniksen 
(dbonn2@pdx.edu) or Dr. Frank at LFrank@pdx.edu.          
Questions about your Rights as Research Participants        
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, please Research 
and Strategic Partnerships, Market Center Building 6th floor, Portland State University, 
503-725-4288. By completing this survey, you are certifying that you are 18 years of age 
or older, that you have read and understood the above information and agree to take part 
in the survey. To print this consent form on a PC, press CTRL + P. To print this consent 
form on a Mac, press COMMAND + P. If at this point you choose to continue in this 
research study, please click "I consent" to continue.           
 
o   I consent    o   I do NOT consent    
  
 
